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1. Attribution of a value to the term alpha-function is a task of psycho-analysis and can be achieved in no other way. Its status, as I discuss it here, is that of an unknown variable to be used to satisfy the need for a system of abstraction adequate to the requirements of psycho-analysis. This and related problems are objects of the enquiry; they are also instruments by which the enquiry is conducted.1 A distinction must be made between the concept of alpha-function and the realization which is felt to approximate sufficiently closely to the theory in which this concept is employed to warrant appropriation of the term alpha-function as a name, however temporary, for the realization.
2. The genesis of all abstraction is to be supposed, for purposes of analytic investigation, to be a factor in alpha-function. Such an hypothesis is compatible with the association of breakdown in alpha-function with predominance of beta-elements which are remarkable for their concreteness to a point where some patients regard words not as the names of things but as things-in-themselves. The hypothesis must be matched against emotional experiences that are a part of the clinical problem of establishing a value for alpha-function itself. First we need to know what is the counterpart of a sense impression in the relationship of a person with an emotional experience. The sense-organs, the awareness belonging to them and their realizations derive from the sensuous experience of concrete objects. What deals with the counterparts of a sense impression of an emotional experience? How are these counterparts of a sense impression then transformed into alpha-elements? It is helpful to postulate1 sense impressions of an emotional experience